

## **CANADA'S AUTOMATED EARTHQUAKE NOTIFICATION SERVICE**

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### **ABSTRACT:**

The Geological Survey of Canada (GSC) provides automatic notification of significant earthquakes to agencies who need to respond rapidly. Currently dam operators in Ontario, New Brunswick and Quebec use this service ("ANHAS") to prioritize and set the level of dam inspection. GSC uses its own 120-seismograph network plus data from another 90 seismographs in Canada and the U.S. Automatic earthquake location software (AUTOLOC) provides magnitude and location estimates, usually within 5-10 minutes of an earthquake, and GSC uses three independent sources of real-time AUTOLOC information for reliability. The notifications contain the basic earthquake information as well as response actions pre-defined for each client's facility and are transmitted by a variety of secure telecommunication means. Most dam operators now use response schemes based on *ad hoc* combinations of earthquake magnitude and its distance from each facility. Such schemes are not optimal, and have inherent flaws. A more reliable way would be to (i) estimate the peak ground acceleration at each site using the ground motion relations of the National Building Code, (ii) classify the shaking level (e.g. Negligible <1.25, Minimal 1.25-2.5, Weak 2.5-5, Moderate 5-10, and Strong >10%g), and (iii) base the response on the shaking classification level and the dam category. GSC encourages the development of such a national best-practice earthquake response scheme for Canadian dam operators.

### **RÉSUMÉ:**

La Commission géologique du Canada (CGC) fournit automatiquement des avis relatifs aux séismes importants aux organismes qui doivent intervenir rapidement. Actuellement, les exploitants de barrages en Ontario, au Nouveau-Brunswick et au Québec utilisent ce service («ANHAS») pour prioriser et déterminer les niveaux d'inspection des barrages. La CGC utilise son propre réseau de 120 sismographes en plus de 90 autres sismographes répartis au Canada et aux États-Unis. Le logiciel de localisation automatique de séismes AUTOLOC (*Automatic earthquake location*) fournit des estimations de la magnitude et de l'emplacement, généralement en moins de 5 à 10 minutes d'un séisme, et la CGC utilise pour assurer la fiabilité trois sources indépendantes d'information AUTOLOC en temps réel. Les avis présentent l'information de base sur les séismes ainsi que des interventions prédéfinies pour les installations de chaque client et sont transmis par diverses voies de télécommunications protégées. La plupart des exploitants de barrages utilisent maintenant des plans d'intervention fondés sur des combinaisons *ad hoc* de magnitudes et de distances entre les séismes et les installations. Ces plans ne sont pas optimaux et présentent plusieurs défauts inhérents. Il serait plus fiable i) d'estimer l'accélération maximale du sol en chaque emplacement d'après les relations de mouvement du sol fournies dans le Code national du bâtiment, ii) de classer l'intensité des secousses (p. ex. négligeable < 1,25, minime 1,25 à 2,5, faible 2,5 à 5, modérée 5 à 10 et forte > 10 % g) et iii) de baser l'intervention sur la classification de l'intensité des secousses ainsi que sur la catégorie de barrage. La CGC encourage l'élaboration d'une telle pratique exemplaire nationale en matière de plans d'intervention en cas de séisme pour les exploitants de barrages canadiens.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

The Geological Survey of Canada (GSC) provides an automated rapid earthquake notification service (called ANHAS – Automated Natural Hazard Announcement Service) for agencies in Canada that need to respond quickly to significant earthquakes. This service is now widely used in the Canadian railway industry. As well, some dam operators in Ontario, New Brunswick and Quebec use the service to prioritize and initiate dam inspections after strong earthquakes. But each company uses its own set of in-house rules to decide how to respond to an earthquake. The GSC seeks to encourage the development of a uniform national best-practice for the industry’s response to significant earthquakes (as is now in place in the railway industry).

The GSC operates a national network of more than 120 continuous online seismograph stations that record earthquake activity in all parts of Canada, and accesses data from 90 other independently-operated stations in Canada and the adjacent U.S. to supplement its coverage. These data are used by an automatic earthquake location program (AUTOLOC) that provides location and magnitude of earthquakes in near-real-time, usually within 5-10 minutes of the occurrence of the earthquake. Arrangements with the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) make it possible to extend the coverage of the notification system to facilities operated by Canadian companies in the continental U.S. AUTOLOC solutions are reviewed and revised by GSC’s analysts and the earthquake solutions are added to the national earthquake database (Figure 1).

ANHAS continuously monitors earthquake activity 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. Three independent, overlapping AUTOLOC systems, two operated by GSC and one by USGS, provide automatic backup in case one of the systems goes off-line. ANHAS employs the ground motion curves used by the 1995 National




Figure 1: Seismicity map of Canada.

Building Code of Canada (NBCC), which recognizes the significantly different attenuation relationships in eastern and western Canada, to provide an effective and efficient way to estimate the potential shaking caused by the earthquake. ANHAS automatically keeps track of the location of any of the earthquakes it detects and applies the appropriate attenuation relationship to estimate the ground motion effects in each case. By using standard ground motion relations and the NBCC philosophy (which designs buildings in terms of peak ground shaking hazard) a consistent level of safety can be provided for all dams anywhere in Canada or the U.S.

ANHAS notifications are issued to clients affected by a significant earthquake automatically via secure telecommunication procedures (ssh, sftp), where feasible, or by email or facsimile otherwise. In addition, pager or cell phone alerts can be delivered to individual personnel to alert them quickly that an earthquake has occurred. The procedures can be customized for each client but always include a set of predefined response actions for each facility close to the earthquake as well as the basic information about the earthquake. Each client's notification criteria usually include a 'near-miss' category which identifies earthquakes strong enough to be felt, but too weak to cause real problems. This avoids over-reaction by the operators, develops operator familiarity, and provides a useful validation of the operation of the notification/response system. 'Near-miss' events are actually much more common than earthquakes causing real damage.

Since its inception in 1998, ANHAS has been providing notifications for four railways with more than 55000 km of track, and three hydroelectric companies with 485 hydroelectric and nuclear power facilities.

## **2 SEISMOGRAPH NETWORKS**

### ***2.1 GSC Network***

The Geological Survey of Canada (GSC) operates the primary network of over 120 high-gain seismographs, and over 120 low-gain or strong motion accelerographs, that together make up the Canadian National Seismograph Network (CNSN). The high-gain instruments are used to record weak ground motion from distant sites and small earthquakes. The low-gain accelerographs are used to record the strong ground shaking at nearby sites from larger earthquakes likely to cause damage. For increased reliability, the continuous data streams from the seismograph network are acquired and analysed in near-real-time at two GSC offices, one in Ottawa and the other near Victoria. At the moment, the strong motion data does not feed in to the automated system, but will likely be added in the near future.

### ***2.2 Other Cooperating Networks***

POLARIS (POLARIS 2007) is a Canadian geophysical research consortium focused on investigation of structure and dynamics of the Earth's lithosphere and the prediction of earthquake ground motion. It received funding from Canada Foundation for Innovation to install of satellite-telemetry arrays of portable geophysical observatories in Canada. Those funds were matched by funds from Ontario Innovation Trust, Ontario Challenge Fund, Ontario Power Generation, British Columbia Knowledge Development Fund, BC Hydro, BHP Billiton, Manitoba government, Natural Resources Canada and other sources. The real-time POLARIS network currently consists of about 75 seismographs that provide data, via satellite or the internet, that is forwarded to the GSC for archiving and dissemination, and AUTOLOC processing.

The U.S.'s Advanced National Seismograph Network (ANSS 2007) stations south of the border are very important for improving the accuracy of automatic locations for earthquakes that occur just outside Canada but close enough to cause possible damage. Real-time data streams from selected seismographs near the Canada-US border are exchanged cooperatively with the USGS. Selected data from both the POLARIS and ANSS networks are merged in real time by the GSC, and analysed together with the data from the CNSN network. Figure 2 is a map of the stations available to ANHAS.



When it has located a seismic event, AUTOLOC sends email messages containing the earthquake coordinates and magnitude, together with quality and other detection parameters, to the GSC personnel on call, and to other automatic programs such as ANHAS. AUTOLOC is currently sending the emails within 5 to 10 minutes of their occurrence (Figure 3). Some of this delay is irreducible (the time taken for the seismic waves to propagate to the seismographs, for example), but the rest of the delay is slowly being reduced by using faster computers and smarter algorithms.




Figure 3: Weekly statistics for the delay between an earthquake and the AUTOLOC message. The median time delay has remained relatively constant despite increased complexities in the AUTOLOC system and the use of more stations for locations. The time delay for the slowest notifications (85th percentile) has dropped significantly (more than 40%) over the past 5 years.

#### 4 ANHAS

GSC created the ANHAS automatic earthquake notification service to manage the information produced by AUTOLOC and forward it to industrial clients. ANHAS provides the rapid information about strong earthquakes that the clients need in order to respond effectively and efficiently when such an earthquake disrupts their operations. Clients have primarily been large transportation companies (Canadian National, Canadian Pacific Railway) and provincial power utilities (Ontario Power Generation, Hydro-Quebec, New Brunswick Power). ANHAS messages are transmitted automatically to these clients very soon after it gets an appropriate AUTOLOC message, so the messages are usually received within 5-10 minutes of the earthquake. Each message tells the client which of their facilities is most likely to be at risk because of the earthquake and suggests the (pre-defined) prudent response actions (see below).

Wherever possible, GSC uses secure telecommunication means to transmit ANHAS messages involving secure shell protocols (ssh), but it can also provide email or facsimile messages and cell phone or pager alerts following earthquakes as required. In fact, when dealing with emergency response information, it is advisable to deliver the message by a variety of channels to ensure its successful delivery in case a particular delivery method fails.

ANHAS relies on an AUTOLOC system running at the GSC's Ottawa office as the primary source of information about earthquakes but maintains a duplicate system running at its office (Pacific Geoscience Centre) near Victoria to provide additional reliability. As discussed above, selected data from the GSC, POLARIS and U.S. seismograph networks are delivered in real time to both systems; either system can provide rapid

information for earthquakes in all parts of Canada. In addition, GSC has developed online access to the autoloc-like system run by the US Geological Survey in Denver, Colorado, which uses seismic data from the entire ANSS. In this way, standard ANHAS notifications based on data from the USGS Denver operation can be produced seamlessly for clients with facilities located in the U.S. For example, the ANHAS system covers the extensive operations of Canadian rail companies in the U.S. which operate trains as far south as New Orleans.

ANHAS is an automated system that will react to a strong earthquake quickly. One of its primary functions is to screen out false alarms from the AUTOLOC systems. It does this by carefully considering the amount of data that is used for each AUTOLOC event. For the most part it can provide reasonably accurate information about *bona fide* earthquakes within a few minutes. However, the GSC continuously monitors the operation of the system and will issue updates on the magnitude and location of strong earthquakes anywhere in Canada after its staff review the seismic data. The review process can often take an hour or so to carry out, longer if it occurs outside normal office hours. If a significant change in the location or magnitude of the earthquake is found in the review process (a change that might alter a client response to the earthquake) ANHAS will issue a second notification message to the client with revised response actions.

ANHAS is a best-effort, no-fault contract service and there is an annual fee charged to those companies who receive the service. ANHAS is not offered to individuals.

## 5 DETERMINING THE STRENGTH OF SHAKING FROM EARTHQUAKE SIZE AND LOCATION

The chief output from AUTOLOC (earthquake location and magnitude) provides considerable information to a client's officers who are responding to an earthquake emergency from a control room. For example it may confirm that the magnitude was below the threshold considered (even if the strength of shaking was frightening in the control room) or that the earthquake mildly felt in the control room was in fact a strong one close to one of their remote facilities that has just gone "off the air". But our experience has been that few emergency officers are comfortable making response decisions based on such information. Simple response rules have therefore been devised based on earthquake magnitude and distance (see Section 6). Section 6 also shows why these rules are rather crude and Section 7 indicates a better method.

The way in which strong shaking dies away with distance from the earthquake epicentre is generally understood, though the details are imprecise and involve extrapolation because we have few measurements close to strong earthquakes (especially in eastern Canada). A common measure of shaking is Peak horizontal Ground Acceleration (PGA), expressed in terms of g or %g (where  $1\text{ g} = 9.8\text{ m/s}^2$ ). While the use of PGA for building structural design was superseded by "spectral acceleration" in the 2005 edition of the National Building Code of Canada (NBCC), PGA is still widely used as an estimator for damage and for geotechnical design. This is because force and acceleration are linearly related, and it is relatively straightforward to envision what effects might occur in a given structure shaken by a particular earthquake by considering the peak ground acceleration involved as a static push. ANHAS has continued to use the PGA relations from the 1985-1995 NBCC.

The 1995 NBCC used two regional attenuation relationships for PGA generated by earthquakes in Canada. Equations 1 and 2 are the Hasegawa et al. (1981) relations modified to base-10 logarithm.

$$\text{Eastern Canada:} \quad \log_{10}(\text{PGA}) = 0.53 + 0.56 * \text{MAG} - 1.1 * \log_{10}(\text{KM} + 20) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Western Canada:} \quad \log_{10}(\text{PGA}) = 1.00 + 0.56 * \text{MAG} - 1.5 * \log_{10}(\text{KM} + 20) \quad (2)$$

where PGA is in units of  $\text{cm/s}^2$ , MAG is Richter magnitude (or its equivalent (Nuttli) in eastern Canada), and KM is epicentral distance in kilometres. The western equation is intended for use strictly within the Cordillera, basically B.C., Yukon and western parts of Alberta and NWT, while the eastern equation is intended for any part of Canada east of the Cordillera. Equation 1 is also appropriate for the northeastern U.S. These relationships are based on observations of the ground motion from some of the stronger earthquakes that have occurred in or near Canada, in some cases from direct recordings on seismological instruments or from felt and/or damage reports

compiled after the earthquake. Two relationships are required because the attenuation of earthquake ground motion with distance is significantly less in eastern Canada than it is in the Cordillera. For a given magnitude, an earthquake can be felt to almost twice the distance in the eastern part of Canada than in the western (Figures 4 A and B). For earthquakes that occur near the boundary of east and west an appropriate combination of the two relations is used (Figure 4C).




Figure 4: Area affected by strong shaking from a magnitude 6 earthquake: A) in western Canada, B) in eastern Canada, and C) on the West-East Cordilleran boundary (red line)

Other formulae may be considered as the basis for the ground motion relationships in ANHAS. In fact, the GSC has, in one case, used the accumulated earthquake recordings in a particular region to define a custom attenuation curve for a client operating in that region. However, many years of experience and development of more recent relationships indicate that the Equations 1 and 2 are conservative in nature and provide a reasonable level of confidence in the prediction of ground shaking from earthquakes. Other curves may be more efficient in the sense that they reduce the number of facilities that may be assigned to certain shaking categories (and would also reduce the number of false alarms), but as it is less certain that they will identify *all* the appropriate dams they would not increase the overall protection provided by the ANHAS notification system.

## 6 CURRENT DAM NOTIFICATION CRITERIA

A number of hydroelectric generators currently receive ANHAS earthquake notifications but each company relies on its own individual criteria to define the response required after an earthquake. These criteria are based on sets of magnitude-distance pairs. In one scheme “Magnitudes 4.0 to 4.9 at distances less than 80 km” is classified as *Minimal Shaking*. The weakness of the magnitude-distance type criteria is that similar operator responses are prescribed for a wide range of ground motion values. The *Minimal Shaking* criterion defined above corresponds to a wide range of ground shaking, from 0.5%g to 7%g (the latter corresponding to a magnitude 4.9 earthquake right underfoot) and with a wide range of outcomes (basically from “not felt” to possible moderate damage). A relatively short cutoff distance (180 km) is also used in some schemes, which effectively ignores the strong ground shaking that earthquakes of magnitude 6.0 or greater can cause at larger distances. A magnitude 6.5 earthquake in eastern Canada can generate peak shaking of 3%g or more to beyond 200 km. In addition, in some regions different magnitude-distance pairs are used by different operators, and this may lead to inconsistent response near provincial borders or between adjacent provincial and private dams.

### **6.1 Adjustments of Magnitude-distance Criteria for Eastern Canada**

The same magnitude-distance pairings are not applicable in all parts of Canada, as is immediately apparent from Figure 4. Thus if some international standard such as ICOLD (1988) is applied indiscriminately it has the potential to lead to different and inconsistent responses to earthquakes in eastern and western regions. In addition, as many standards were developed from active earthquake regions, they underestimate the distance extent of strong, potentially-damaging shaking in eastern Canada. Lamontagne and Dascal (2006) suggested that the distance underestimate might be a factor of two to six, and proposed revised magnitude-distance criteria for post-earthquake inspection of dams in Quebec based on eastern Canadian earthquake experience. Our proposed scheme (Section 8) incorporates this reality.

### **6.2 Experience with Magnitude-distance Criteria After the Nisqually Earthquake**

In February 2001 the magnitude 6.8 Nisqually earthquake occurred in northwestern Washington State and strongly shook parts of southwestern B.C. including Vancouver. At the time, ANHAS notifications to the railways were based on magnitude-distance criteria, which specified that a notification should be issued if there was a magnitude 6.0+ event within about 160 km (100 miles) of any track in western Canada. The event was located 175 km from the closest rail track in Canada, so no ANHAS notification was issued to the rail company. In fact the company was overwhelmed by reports of the earthquake from its own personnel and in the media and was chagrined not to have received an earthquake notification even though inspections subsequently showed that there was no damage done to the rail tracks by the shaking. Partly because of this experience, the criteria used by the rail companies has been changed from magnitude-distance to ground shaking (0.6%g, 1.25%g, 2.0%g) to do a better job of identifying the facilities which have experienced similar shaking. Furthermore, the extent of the notification area has been increased to 800 km to better include the effects of distant large earthquakes like Nisqually. These two features should be considered in any notification schema used for dam sites.

## **7 COORDINATED ANHAS CRITERIA FOR CANADIAN RAILWAYS**

Railways comprise an extensive network of facilities, the failure of any segment of which has safety implications. For example, eastern Canadian earthquakes in 1935 and 1988 caused embankment failures (Figure 5) that broke track and so had the potential to cause derailments.



Figure 5: Near Parent, Québec, earthquake vibrations from the 1935 magnitude 6.2 Timiskaming earthquake triggered a 30-metre railway embankment failure, 300 km from the epicentre.

Originally, the railways also used sets of magnitude-distance pairs to define the different responses required after an earthquake. Each company had their own sets of magnitude-distance criteria that categorized the emergency



response required in terms of four levels of action: 1) stop the trains, 2) slow the trains, 3) resume normal speed and 4) take no action. There had to be one set for the east and one set for the west. Different companies had different sets of rules and often reacted to the same earthquake in the same region in different manners. Since ANHAS began earthquake notifications to the rail companies in 1998, the response criteria have been standardized on a scheme that uses estimated PGA from the earthquake, based on its estimated magnitude and location, at all rail lines within 500 miles of the event (Table 1). To do this ANHAS maintains a complete description of the layout of the client's rail networks, currently more than 55 000 km of track.

Table 1: Response criteria used by Canadian railways to earthquake shaking

PGA (%g)	Response
$\geq 2.0$	<b>STOP ALL TRAINS...</b> until inspections have been completed and appropriate speeds established by proper authority
1.25 to 2.0	<b>PROCEED AT RESTRICTED SPEED...</b> until inspections have been completed and appropriate speeds established by proper authority
0.6 to 1.25	<b>RESUME NORMAL TRACK SPEED...</b> magnitude/distance does not meet alarm criteria
$< 0.6$	<b>NO ACTION</b>

In the first two stages ANHAS includes within its message the specific track segments where the condition applies. The RESUME SPEED case is termed the 'near miss' condition and is intended to reduce confusion where a tremor has been felt but the shaking really was not strong enough to cause any problems to the rail lines. These cases are often exacerbated by local media reports which tend to focus on the sensational aspects of an earthquake without being clear on the limited distribution of those effects. Thus, for a strong earthquake, STOP orders may be issued for rail track close to the epicentre, RESTRICTED SPEED (i.e. slow) orders may be issued for track farther away, while, on the periphery of the shaking, RESUME SPEED orders could be issued. In the NO ACTION case, no message is sent.

Messages are transmitted via secure internet communication protocols to various centers controlling rail traffic in different regions of North America, where company personnel take appropriate action. The rail industry is highly integrated and different companies often use or connect to competitors' track, so it is important that all operators in the same region be following the same procedures.

## 8 PROPOSED SCHEME FOR CANADIAN DAMS

### 8.1 PGA Classification Schema for Dams

In order to provide a more consistent response to earthquakes, the GSC proposes a classification scheme based on the PGA relationships of the NBCC (Table 2). In this scheme the strength of ground shaking, PGA, varies by a factor of 2 within each range. This is much more tightly defined than any of the current magnitude-distance ranges in use, and also avoids any overlap of ground shaking between current adjacent ranges. Table 3 shows how the four strongest shaking levels relate to magnitude-distance criteria. This example uses an optional 400-km limit for the most distant earthquakes considered and a lower magnitude limit of 4.0.

Table 2: proposed PGA classification for hydroelectric facilities

PGA (units =%g)	For $M \geq 4.0$ and Distance $\leq 400$ km
$\geq 10.0$	Strong shaking
5.0 to 10.0	Moderate shaking
2.5 to 5.0	Weak shaking
1.25 to 2.5	Minimal shaking
$< 1.25$	No Action

Table 3: Distance (km) for defined shaking level and magnitude

Magnitude	WEST (for Richter magnitude)				EAST (for Nuttli magnitude)			
	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Minimal	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Minimal
4.0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	13
4.1	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	18
4.2	0	0	0	12	0	0	2	22
4.3	0	0	2	15	0	0	5	28
4.4	0	0	4	18	0	0	8	34
4.5	0	0	6	21	0	0	12	40
4.6	0	0	8	25	0	0	16	48
4.7	0	0	11	29	0	1	20	56
4.8	0	1	14	34	0	4	26	66
4.9	0	3	17	38	0	7	31	77
5.0	0	5	20	44	0	11	38	89
5.1	0	7	24	50	0	14	45	102
5.2	0	10	28	56	0	19	53	118
5.3	0	13	32	63	3	24	62	135
5.4	2	16	37	70	6	29	73	154
5.5	4	19	42	78	9	35	84	176
5.6	6	22	47	87	13	42	97	200
5.7	9	26	53	97	17	50	112	228
5.8	12	30	60	107	22	59	128	259
5.9	14	35	67	119	27	69	147	293
6.0	18	40	75	131	33	80	167	332
6.1	21	45	84	145	39	92	191	376
6.2	25	51	93	160	47	106	217	400
6.3	29	58	103	176	55	122	247	400
6.4	33	65	114	194	65	140	280	400
6.5	38	72	127	213	75	159	317	400
6.6	43	81	140	234	87	182	359	400
6.7	49	90	154	257	101	207	400	400
6.8	55	99	170	282	116	235	400	400
6.9	62	110	187	309	133	267	400	400
7.0	69	122	206	338	152	303	400	400
7.1	77	135	226	370	173	343	400	400
7.2	86	149	248	400	197	388	400	400
7.3	96	164	272	400	224	400	400	400
7.4	106	180	298	400	255	400	400	400
7.5	117	198	327	400	289	400	400	400

Note: Strong ( $\geq 10\%$ g), Moderate(5-10%g), Weak (2.5-5%g) and Minimal shaking (1.25-2.5%g)

## 8.2 Schema Incorporating Dam Classification Information

The Canadian Dam Association (1999) Dam Safety Guidelines provide one method to classify dams by their consequence of failure. Table 4 suggests a scheme to prioritize the post-earthquake inspection of hydroelectric dam structures according to the strength of shaking and their CDA category. While the inspection periods in the table are speculative, and not intended to be implemented without extensive discussion and refinement, they are broadly based on the inspection requirements currently used with the magnitude-distance criteria. A mock-up of the proposed notification scheme is given in Figure 6.

Other classification schemes may be envisioned, such as the International Code Council (ICC 2007), a US-based non-governmental organization which provides another convenient means for the consistent classification of different engineered structures, and can be adapted to work within the ANHAS system. Alternatively, all

Thu Apr 19 11:08:54 2007

AUTOMATIC EARTHQUAKE NOTICE  
(WILL BE CONFIRMED SHORTLY)

MESSAGE FROM THE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF CANADA  
Ottawa Datacentre

FOR XXXX DAM SAFETY OFFICE

The epicentre of the earthquake of  
2007/04/19 at 14:58 (Universal Time)  
33 KM SW of ONLY A TEST, C.A  
is located at latitude 46.70 N, longitude 81.56 W  
with a magnitude of 5.7

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**Moderate shaking (5.0-10 %g):**

32 km from CONISTON-MAIN (CDA-HIGH)  
38 km from STINSON-MAIN (CDA-HIGH)  
38 km from STINSON-SIDE DAM (CDA-V LOW)  
38 km from WANAPITEI LAKE-CONTROL (CDA-HIGH)  
41 km from MCVITTIE-MAIN (CDA-HIGH)  
41 km from MCVITTIE-SIDE (CDA-HIGH)

**Surveillance checks to be carried out**

**Within 12 hours for Very High CDA dams,**

**Within 24 hours for High CDA dams and**

**Within 3 days for Low CDA dams**

**For Very Low CDA dams the need of surveillance check depends on the  
location of the earthquake epicentre and the condition of the dam**

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**Weak shaking (2.5-5.0 %g):**

64 km from MESOMIKENDA LAKE-BLOCK 1-4 (CDA-V LOW)  
65 km from MESOMIKENDA LAKE-BLOCK 5 (CDA-V LOW)  
69 km from RED CEDAR LAKE NORTH BLOCK (CDA-HIGH)  
69 km from RED CEDAR LAKE SOUTH CONTROL (CDA-HIGH)  
71 km from CROSS LAKE (CDA-V LOW)  
79 km from TOMIKO LAKE-MAIN (CDA-LOW)  
79 km from TOMIKO LAKE-SIMPSON S CK AUX (CDA-V LOW)  
79 km from TOMIKO LAKE-TIMBER CRIB BLOCK (CDA-V LOW)  
83 km from CRYSTAL FALLS-MAIN (CDA-HIGH)  
95 km from LADY EVELYN LAKE (MATTAWAPIKA)  
96 km from MATTAGAMI LAKE-MAIN (CDA-HIGH)  
102 km from INDIAN CHUTE-MAIN (CDA-V LOW)  
104 km from BLACK BEAR LAKE (BLOCK 3)  
104 km from RABBIT LAKE (CDA-HIGH)  
104 km from SAND LAKE (BLOCK 2)  
106 km from HOUND CHUTE-MAIN DAM (CDA-V LOW)  
106 km from HOUND CHUTE-SPILLWAY (CDA-V LOW)  
107 km from RAGGED CHUTE AIR PLANT-MAIN (CDA-V LOW)  
112 km from MISTINIKON LAKE (CDA-HIGH)

**Surveillance checks to be carried out**

**Within 3 days for Very High and High CDA dams,**

**Within 14 days for Low CDA dams**

**For Very Low CDA dams the need of surveillance check depends on the  
location of the earthquake epicentre and the condition of the dam**

Figure 6: Example of an earthquake notification for hydroelectric facilities (formatting has been changed to save space and some entries have been deleted)

facilities can remain unclassified. In this case the ANHAS notification would simply indicate the ground shaking experienced by each structure and the operator’s personnel would deal with the structures beginning with those in the area of the strongest shaking.

Table 4: Speculative ANHAS Inspection Schedules for Hydroelectric Facilities

PGA classification		Suggested Inspection Deadline for Dams			
PGA (units =%g)	For $M \geq 4.0$ and Distance $\leq 400$ km	Very High CDA dams	High CDA dams	Low CDA dams	Very Low CDA dams
>10.0	Strong shaking	12 hours	24 hours	3 days	14 days
5.0 to 10.0	Moderate shaking	12 hours	24 hours	3 days	Note A
2.5 to 5.0	Weak shaking	24 hours	24 hours	14 days	Note A
1.25 to 2.5	Minimal shaking	5 days	5 days	Note A	Note A
< 1.25	No Action	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Note A: the need for inspection check depends on location of earthquake epicentre and the condition of dams  
N/A is Not Applicable

## 9 CONCLUSIONS

Presently, operators have a variety of *ad hoc* policies for responding to strong earthquakes, which means that similar hydroelectric generating facilities located on the same waterway can be treated in different manners by different companies following an earthquake. In addition, the schemes currently in use suffer from a number of inherent difficulties because they are usually based on sets of magnitude-distance pairs which prescribe the same response for widely differing ranges of peak ground shaking, ignore strong ground shaking that can be generated at larger distances by strong earthquakes in eastern North America, and do not reasonably take into account the variations in earthquake ground motion propagation that occur in eastern and western Canada.

GSC proposes a uniform rapid earthquake notification scheme for Canadian operators of hydroelectric dam facilities anywhere in Canada (or the U.S.). The scheme is based on criteria developed in the 1995 National Building Code of Canada. The criteria define four ranges of ground shaking, in terms of Peak Ground Acceleration as a percentage of g (force due to gravity) namely *Minimal* (1.25%g to 2.5%g), *Weak* (2.5% to 5.0%g), *Moderate* (5.0%g to 10%g) and *Strong* (10%g or more), and responses in each range prescribe specific inspection schedules for different types of structures ranging from hours to days. The structural response to earthquakes can be based on CDA classifications of the structures or other means convenient to the operators. In this way similar structures which experience similar levels of ground shaking during earthquake events will be attended to in a consistent and timely fashion by the dam operators responsible, regardless of the location of the structure. The scheme will also help avoid overreaction and unnecessary downtime in marginal situations.

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